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Abstract—Theoretical studies on physical layer security often
adopt the secrecy outage probability as the performance metric
for wireless communications over quasi-static fading channels.
The secrecy outage probability has two limitations from a
practical point of view: a) it does not give any insight into
the eavesdropper’s decodability of confidential messages; b)
it cannot characterize the amount of information leakage to
the eavesdropper when an outage occurs. Motivated by the
limitations of the secrecy outage probability, we propose three
new secrecy metrics for secure transmissions over quasi-static
fading channels. The first metric establishes a link between the
concept of secrecy outage and the decodability of messages at the
eavesdropper. The second metric provides an error-probability-
based secrecy metric which is typically used for the practical
implementation of secure wireless systems. The third metric
characterizes how much or how fast the confidential information
is leaked to the eavesdropper. We show that the proposed secrecy
metrics collectively give a more comprehensive understanding
of physical layer security over fading channels and enable
one to appropriately design secure communication systems with
different views on how secrecy is measured.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, secrecy outage probabil-
ity, secure transmission design, quasi-static fading channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
AN unprecedented amount of private and sensitive infor-mation is transmitted over wireless channels as a result
of the ubiquitous wireless devices adopted in modern life.
Security issues associated with wireless communications con-
sequently have become critical due to the unchangeable open
nature of the wireless medium. As a complement to traditional
cryptographic techniques, physical layer security has been
proposed for ensuring secure wireless communications by
exploiting the characteristics of wireless channels [2, 3]. Shan-
non [4] introduced the notion of information-theoretic secrecy,
which does not rely on assumptions about the computational
abilities of the eavesdropper. Classical information-theoretic
secrecy1 requires that the amount of information leakage to the
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1In this paper, we use the term “classical information-theoretic secrecy” to
refer to Shannon’s perfect secrecy, strong secrecy, and weak secrecy, which
will be described later in Section II-A.
eavesdropper vanishes. It guarantees that the eavesdropper’s
optimal attack is to guess the message at random, and hence
the eavesdropper’s decoding error probability, Pe, asymptot-
ically goes to 1. In his seminal work [5], Wyner introduced
the wiretap channel, and addressed the tradeoff between the
information rate achieved by the intended receiver and the
level of ignorance at the eavesdropper. This result was later
extended to the broadcast channel with confidential messages
[6] and the Gaussian wiretap channel [7].
More recently, physical layer security over wireless fading
channels has been extensively studied, e.g., [8–12]. In partic-
ular, practical scenarios involving imperfect or no knowledge
about the eavesdropper’s instantaneous channel state informa-
tion (CSI) has drawn an increasing amount of attention, e.g.,
see [13] and references therein. The secrecy performance in
such scenarios is often characterized by either ergodic secrecy
capacity [8] or secrecy outage probability [11, 12]. For a
system in which the encoded messages can span sufficient
channel realizations to capture the ergodic features of the
fading channel, the ergodic secrecy capacity characterizes the
capacity limit subject to the constraint of classical information-
theoretic secrecy. For transmission over quasi-static fading
channels where classical information-theoretic secrecy is not
always achievable, the (classical) secrecy outage probabil-
ity measures the probability of failing to achieve classical
information-theoretic secrecy. With either the ergodic secrecy
capacity or the secrecy outage probability as the secrecy
metric, many researchers have studied secure transmission
designs and/or secrecy enhancements, e.g., [14–18].
Classical secrecy outage probability has two major lim-
itations in evaluating the secrecy performance of wireless
systems.
a) Classical secrecy outage probability does not give any
insight into the eavesdropper’s ability to decode the con-
fidential messages. The eavesdropper’s decodability is an
intuitive measure of security in real-world communication
systems when classical information-theoretic secrecy is
not always achievable, and error-probability-based secrecy
metrics are often adopted to quantify secrecy performance
in the literature, e.g., [19–21] focusing on infinite-length
code design, [22–24] investigating finite-length coding
schemes, [25] utilizing probabilistic ciphering, [26] inves-
tigating secure network coding, and [27] studying secrecy
with compressive sensing. A general secrecy requirement
for the eavesdropper’s decoding error probability can be
given as Pe ≥ ǫ, where 0 < ǫ ≤ 1 denotes the minimum
acceptable value of Pe. In contrast, classical secrecy outage
probability reflects only an extremely stringent requirement
2on Pe for ǫ → 1, i.e., requiring ǫ → 1, since classical
information-theoretic secrecy guarantees Pe → 1.
b) The amount of information leakage to the eavesdrop-
per cannot be characterized. When classical information-
theoretic secrecy is not achievable, some information will
be leaked to the eavesdropper. Different secure trans-
mission designs that lead to the same secrecy outage
probability may actually result in very different amounts
of information leakage. Consequently, it is important to
know how much or how fast the confidential information
is leaked to the eavesdropper to obtain a finer view of the
secrecy performance. However, the classical outage-based
approach is not able to evaluate the amount of information
leakage when a secrecy outage occurs.
It is worth mentioning that, apart from the two above men-
tioned limitations, the classical secrecy outage probability also
has a severe limitation in evaluating the secrecy performance
of systems with finite-length coding schemes. Since classical
information-theoretic secrecy cannot be achieved by any cod-
ing scheme with a finite-length codeword, the classical secrecy
outage probability based on the classical information-theoretic
secrecy cannot be adopted in the studies focusing on finite-
length coding schemes. Thus, it is of significant importance
to examine secrecy metrics specifically for wireless systems
with finite-length codes, although such a study is beyond the
scope of this paper.
B. Our Approach and Contribution
As previously discussed, the classical information-theoretic
secrecy is not always achievable for transmissions over quasi-
static fading channels, and we cannot ensure that the eaves-
dropper’s decoding error probability always goes to 1. The
classical secrecy outage probability, which is the secrecy
metric for quasi-static fading channels, in fact has limitations
in evaluating the secrecy performance of wireless systems.
This motivates us to propose new secrecy metrics for wireless
transmissions focusing on quasi-static fading channels in this
paper. The classical secrecy outage probability is based on
the concept of classical information-theoretic secrecy. On
the other hand, our proposed secrecy metrics are based on
another regime of interest in physical layer security, namely
the partial secrecy regime. The partial secrecy of a system
is often evaluated using the equivocation, which reflects the
level at which the eavesdropper is confused. The study of
equivocation for secrecy can be found as early as Wyner’s
pioneering work for the wiretap channel [5]. Similarly, Csisza´r
and Ko¨rner [6] used the normalized equivocation to quantify
partial secrecy for the broadcast channel with confidential
information. Importantly, the equivocation is closely related
to the decoding error probability [5, 28, 29]. Therefore, eval-
uating the secrecy performance on the basis of equivocation
can reflect the decodability of confidential messages at the
eavesdropper.
Specifically, we propose three new secrecy metrics:
1) Extended from the classical definition of secrecy outage,
a generalized formulation of secrecy outage probability
is proposed. The generalized secrecy outage probability
takes into account the level of secrecy measured by equiv-
ocation, and hence establishes a link between the concept
of secrecy outage and the decodability of messages at the
eavesdropper.
2) An asymptotic lower bound on the eavesdropper’s decod-
ing error probability is proposed. This proposed metric
provides a direct link to error-probability-based secrecy
metrics that are often used for the practical implementa-
tion of security in wireless systems operating over fading
channels.
3) A metric evaluating the average information leakage
rate is proposed. This proposed secrecy metric gives an
answer to the important question of how much or how
fast the confidential information is leaked to the eaves-
dropper when classical information-theoretic secrecy is
not achieved.
We note that both the generalized secrecy outage probability
and the asymptotic lower bound on the eavesdropper’s de-
coding error probability give insights into the eavesdropper’s
ability to decode the confidential messages. In comparing these
two metrics, we highlight that the asymptotic lower bound on
the eavesdropper’s decoding error probability provides a more
direct bridge to the error-probability-based secrecy metrics.
Although the eavesdropper’s decoding error probability cannot
be exactly characterized, the asymptotic lower bound gives a
worst-case estimation of the eavesdropper’s decodability. On
the other hand, the generalized secrecy outage probability is
extended from the classical secrecy outage probability. Hence,
existing studies on secrecy outage probability can be easily
extended to the generalized secrecy outage probability.
To illustrate the use of the newly proposed secrecy metrics,
we evaluate the secrecy performance of an example wireless
system with fixed-rate wiretap codes. We show that the pro-
posed secrecy metrics can provide a more comprehensive and
in-depth understanding of the secrecy performance over fading
channels. Moreover, we investigate the impact of the new
secrecy metrics on the transmission design. We find that the
newly proposed secrecy metrics lead to very different optimal
design parameters that optimize the secrecy performance of
the system, compared with the optimal design minimizing
the classical secrecy outage probability. We also find that
applying the optimal design that minimizes the secrecy outage
probability can result in a large secrecy loss, if the actual
system requires a low decodability at the eavesdropper and/or
a low information leakage rate.
It is worth mentioning that this work is solely motivated
by the limitations of the classical secrecy outage probability
from a more practical point of view. Our proposed new
secrecy metrics based on the concept of partial secrecy do not
imply that the secrecy metrics based on classical information-
theoretic secrecy are inappropriate from the information-
theoretic perspective. We acknowledge the importance of
requiring classical information-theoretic secrecy for research
on information-theoretic security. Meanwhile, we notice the
large gap between the requirement of information-theoretic
security and the condition of practical secrecy. We hope that
the newly proposed secrecy metrics can enable contributions
that bridge the gap between theory and practice in physical
3layer security.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II provides background information on classical
information-theoretic secrecy and partial secrecy. Section III
introduces the three new secrecy metrics for wireless transmis-
sions over fading channels. Section IV illustrates the use of the
newly proposed metrics by evaluating the secrecy performance
of an example wireless system with fixed-rate wiretap codes.
Section V demonstrates the impact of the new secrecy metrics
on system design, and finally Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Consider the basic wiretap-channel system shown in Fig-
ure 1. A transmitter, Alice, sends confidential information,
M , to an intended receiver, Bob, in the presence of an
eavesdropper, Eve. The source is stationary and ergodic. The
confidential information, M , is encoded into a n-vector Xn.
The received vectors at Bob and Eve are denoted by Y n and
Zn, respectively. The entropy of the source information and
the residual uncertainty for the message at the eavesdropper
are denoted by H(M) and H(M | Zn), respectively.
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Fig. 1: Basic wiretap channel.
A. Classical Information-Theoretic Secrecy
As mentioned before, classical information-theoretic se-
crecy implies that the amount of information leakage to the
eavesdropper vanishes, and guarantees that the eavesdropper’s
optimal attack is to guess the message at random. From
Shannon’s definition, perfect secrecy requires statistical inde-
pendence between the original message and Eve’s observation,
which is given by
H(M | Zn) = H(M) or, equivalently, I(M ;Zn) = 0. (1)
Since Shannon’s definition of perfect secrecy is not conve-
nient to be used for further analysis, current research often
investigates strong secrecy or weak secrecy. Strong secrecy
requires asymptotic statistical independence of the message
and Eve’s observation as the codeword length goes to infinity,
i.e., limn→∞ I(M ;Zn) = 0. Weak secrecy requires that the
rate of information leaked to the eavesdropper vanishes, i.e.,
limn→∞
1
n
I(M ;Zn) = 0. Since strong secrecy, weak secrecy
and Shannon’s perfect secrecy all belong to the classical
information-theoretic secrecy regime, for simplicity we use the
term “classical information-theoretic secrecy” to refer to such
a regime in this paper. For simplicity, we also do not explicitly
denote the assumption of n → ∞ for the discussions in the
rest of this paper.
The requirement of no information leakage to Eve in fact
guarantees the highest possible decoding error probability at
Eve. As explained in [2, Remark 3.1], consider that mes-
sages are uniformly taken from a size K set [1, 2, · · · ,K],
and Eve minimizes her decoding error probability Pe by
performing maximum-likelihood decoding. The condition of
no information leakage ensures that Eve can only guess the
original message, and the probability of error under maximum-
likelihood decoding is Pe = K−1K . Therefore, from the decod-
ability point of view, classical information-theoretic secrecy
guarantees Pe ≥ K−1K . Furthermore, when the entropy of the
message is very large so that K →∞, classical information-
theoretic secrecy actually guarantees that Pe asymptotically
goes to 1,
lim
K→∞
Pe ≥ lim
K→∞
K − 1
K
= 1. (2)
In practice, the secrecy requirement on the decodability of
messages at Eve can be generally written as Pe ≥ ǫ for some
ǫ. Depending on the application, the value of ǫ ranges from
0 to 1, which falls outside the classical information-theoretic
secrecy regime.
B. Partial Secrecy
Partial secrecy is often quantified by the equivocation, which
indicates the level at which Eve is confused. In this paper,
we specifically consider the fractional equivocation, which is
defined as [7]
∆ =
H(M | Zn)
H(M)
. (3)
Note that evaluating security on the basis of equivocation is
related to the conventional requirement on the decodability of
messages at Eve [5]. Although there is no one-to-one relation
between the equivocation and the error probability, tight lower
and upper bounds of the decoding error probability can be
derived from the equivocation [28, 29].
When studying secrecy, we particularly want to ensure that
the decoding error probability at the eavesdropper is larger
than a certain level. Thus, it is desirable to have the decoding
error probability at Eve lower bounded by the equivocation.
Still consider the general case where messages are uniformly
taken from a size K set [1, 2, · · · ,K], which achieves the
maximal entropy over an alphabet of size K . Then, the entropy
of the message is given by H(M) = log2(K). From Fano’s
inequality [28, Chapter 2.10], we have
H(M | Zn) ≤ h(Pe) + Pe log2(K), (4)
where h(x) = −x log2(x) − (1− x) log2(1− x), 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
This inequality can be weakened to
Pe ≥
H(M | Zn)− 1
log2(K)
= ∆−
1
log2(K)
. (5)
4When the entropy of the message is very large such that K →
∞, we can further derive (5) as
lim
K→∞
Pe ≥ ∆− lim
K→∞
1
log2(K)
= ∆. (6)
Thus, Pe is asymptotically lower bounded by ∆.
III. NEW SECRECY METRICS FOR WIRELESS
TRANSMISSIONS
Consider the basic wiretap-channel system as introduced in
the previous section. We now assume that the messages are
transmitted over quasi-static fading channels. Bob and Eve
perfectly know their own CSI, but Eve’s instantaneous CSI is
not available at the legitimate side. For wireless transmissions
in such a system, classical information-theoretic secrecy is
not always achievable, and the secrecy outage probability is
commonly used to measure the secrecy performance. From
the classical information-theoretic secrecy perspective, the
classical definition of secrecy outage probability treats the
failure of achieving classical information-theoretic secrecy as
a secrecy outage. Thus, the classical secrecy outage probability
is applicable only for the system which has an extremely
stringent requirement on Eve’s decoding error probability,
ǫ → 1, but cannot handle the general requirement on Eve’s
decoding error probability, 0 < ǫ ≤ 1. In addition, the outage-
based secrecy metric cannot evaluate how much or how fast
the confidential information is leaked to Eve.
Unlike classcial secrecy outage probability, we study the
secrecy performance of wireless communications from the
partial secrecy perspective. For wireless transmissions over
fading channels, the fractional equivocation, ∆, is a random
quantity due to the fading properties of the channel. Thus, we
start from the derivation of ∆ for a given fading realization.
The distribution of ∆ can be obtained according to the
distribution of the channel gains. After that, three new secrecy
metrics are proposed based on the distribution of ∆.
A. Fractional Equivocation for a Given Fading Realization
A given fading realization of the wireless channel is equiv-
alent to the (non-degraded) Gaussian wiretap channel [9].
The value of the fractional equivocation for the Gaussian
wiretap channel actually depends on the coding and transmis-
sion strategies, and there is no general expression applicable
for all scenarios. However, an upper bound on ∆ can be
easily derived following closely from [7, Theorem 1] and [9,
Corollary 2]. The maximum achievable fractional equivocation
for a given fading realization of the wireless channel is given
by
∆ =


1 , if Ce ≤ Cb −R
(Cb − Ce)/R , if Cb −R < Ce < Cb
0 , if Cb ≤ Ce,
(7)
where Cb and Ce denote Bob and Eve’s channel capacities,
respectively, and R = H(M)
n
denotes the secrecy rate for
transmission.
B. New Secrecy Metrics
From (7), we note that ∆ is a random quantity deter-
mined by the instantaneous channel gains and the transmission
rate. Since the instantaneous knowledge of Eve’s channel is
unknown, we cannot directly characterize the instantaneous
secrecy performance of the transmissions. Consequently, a
meaningful system characterization relies on studying the
distribution of ∆, which measures the long-term performance
of the system with time-varying channel realizations. In the
following, we investigate the distribution of ∆ from three
aspects to propose three secrecy metrics.
1) Generalized Secrecy Outage Probability:
Extending the classical definition of secrecy outage proba-
bility, we propose a generalized definition of secrecy outage
probability, given by
pout = P (∆ < θ) , (8)
where P (·) denotes the probability measure and 0 < θ ≤ 1
denotes the minimum acceptable value of the fractional equiv-
ocation.
Since the fractional equivocation is related to the decoding
error probability, the generalized secrecy outage probability
is applicable for systems with different levels of secrecy
requirements measured in terms of Eve’s ability to decode
the confidential messages (by choosing different values of
θ). The classical secrecy outage probability is defined as
P (∆ < 1), and hence is a special case of the new secrecy
outage metric. Apart from the discussion above, another way to
understand the generalized secrecy outage probability can be
described as follows. From (3), the information leakage ratio
to Eve can be written as I(M ;Z
n)
H(M) =1 −∆. The information
leakage ratio quantifies the percentage of transmitted confi-
dential information leaked to the eavesdropper. As such, the
generalized secrecy outage probability, pout = P (∆ < θ) =
P (1−∆ > 1− θ), actually characterizes the probability that
the information leakage ratio is larger than a certain value,
1− θ.
In fact, we can also explain the generalized secrecy outage
probability as an extension of partial secrecy in the Gaussian
channel to the fading channel. Partial secrecy was originally
proposed and investigated in the Gaussian channel in some of
the pioneering studies of physical layer security, e.g., [5–7]. It
has also been adopted in evaluating the secrecy performance
of finite-length codes in the Gaussian channel, e.g., [22, 30,
31]. It is worth mentioning that a secrecy metric similar to the
generalized secrecy outage probability was adopted in [32],
which focused on analyzing the performance of finite-length
codes in the fading channel. In [32], a secrecy metric was
adopted that quantifies the probability of Eve’s decoding error
being less than a given threshold, a result that was motivated
by the fact that finite-length codes cannot guarantee Eve’s
decoding error rate will approach 1. The secrecy metric in [32]
is based on the partial secrecy metric adopted in [31] for finite-
length codes in the Gaussian channel. The fact that [32] also
adopts a partial secrecy metric further shows that classical
secrecy outage probability has a severe limitation in evaluating
5the secrecy performance of wireless systems with finite-length
codes.
2) Average Fractional Equivocation – Asymptotic Lower
Bound on Eavesdropper’s Decoding Error Probability:
Taking the average of the fractional equivocation, we can
derive the (long-term) average value of the fractional equivo-
cation, given by
∆¯ = E{∆}, (9)
where E{·} denotes the expectation operation. Note that the
average fractional equivocation takes the average of the values
of fractional equivocation over all fading realizations. Since
the fading varies slowly compared with one symbol time in
quasi-static fading channels, it takes a relatively long time to
experience a sufficient number of fading realizations during the
transmissions. Thus, to be rigorous, we define ∆¯ as the (long-
term) average fractional equivocation. As discussed earlier
in (6), Eve’s decoding error probability for a given fading
realization is asymptotically lower bounded by the fractional
equivocation. Thus, the average fractional equivocation, ∆¯,
actually gives an asymptotic lower bound on the overall
decoding error probability at Eve, i.e, Pe ≥ ∆¯.
3) Average Information Leakage Rate:
With knowledge of message transmission rate R = H(M)
n
, we
can further derive the average information leakage rate, given
by
RL = E
{
I(M ;Zn)
n
}
= E {(1−∆)R} . (10)
The average information leakage rate tells how fast the in-
formation is leaked to the eavesdropper. Note that the trans-
mission rate R cannot be simply taken out of the expectation
in (10), since R can be a variable parameter (e.g., adaptive-
rate transmission) and its distribution may be correlated with
the distribution of ∆. However, when a fixed-rate transmission
scheme is adopted, (10) can be simplified as
RL = E {(1−∆)R} = (1− ∆¯)R. (11)
Remark 1: The proposed secrecy metrics in this section,
i.e., (8), (9) and (10), are general and can be applied to
evaluate the performance of any coding and transmission
strategy under any system model (e.g., signal-antenna or multi-
antenna systems). A specific scenario is studied as an example
in the next section, wherein the expressions for the proposed
secrecy metrics are further derived in terms of transmission
rates and channel statistics.
IV. WIRELESS TRANSMISSIONS WITH FIXED-RATE
WIRETAP CODES: AN EXAMPLE
A. System Model
We consider the system where a transmitter, Alice, wants
to send confidential information to an intended receiver, Bob,
in the present of an eavesdropper, Eve, over a quasi-static
Rayleigh fading channel. Alice, Bob and Eve are assumed
to have a single antenna each. The instantaneous channel
capacities at Bob and Eve are given by
Cb = log2(1 + γb) (12)
and
Ce = log2(1 + γe), (13)
respectively, where γb and γe denote the instantaneous re-
ceived signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at Bob and Eve, respec-
tively. The instantaneous received SNRs at Bob and Eve have
exponential distributions, given by
fγb(γb) =
1
γ¯b
exp
(
−
γb
γ¯b
)
(14)
and
fγe(γe) =
1
γ¯e
exp
(
−
γe
γ¯e
)
, (15)
respectively, where γ¯e and γ¯e denote the average received
SNRs at Bob and Eve, respectively.
We consider the widely-adopted wiretap code [5] for mes-
sage transmissions. There are two rate parameters, namely,
the codeword transmission rate, Rb = H(X
n)
n
, and the con-
fidential information rate, Rs = H(M)n . A length n wiretap
code is constructed by generating 2nRb codewords xn(w, v),
where w = 1, 2, · · · , 2nRs and v = 1, 2, · · · , 2n(Rb−Rs).
For each message index w, we randomly select v from{
1, 2, · · · , 2n(Rb−Rs)
}
with uniform probability and transmit
the codeword xn(w, v). In addition, we consider fixed-rate
transmission,2 where the transmission rates, i.e., Rb and Rs,
are fixed over time.
Bob and Eve are assumed to perfectly know their own
channels. Hence, Cb and Ce are known at Bob and Eve,
respectively. Alice has statistical knowledge of Bob and Eve’s
channels, but does not know either Bob or Eve’s instantaneous
CSI. We further assume that Bob provides a one-bit feedback
about his channel quality to Alice in order to avoid unneces-
sary transmissions [12, 16]. The one-bit feedback enables an
on-off transmission scheme to guarantee that the transmission
takes place only when Rb ≤ Cb. In addition, the on-off
transmission scheme incurs a probability of transmission,
given by
ptx = P (Rb ≤ Cb) = exp
(
−
2Rb − 1
γ¯b
)
. (16)
B. Secrecy Performance Evaluation
To characterize the secrecy performance of wireless trans-
missions over the fading channel, we start from the investiga-
tion on a given fading realization of the channel.
Proposition 1: For a given fading realization of the wireless
channel, the maximum achievable fractional equivocation for
the wiretap code with Rb ≤ Cb and Rs ≤ Rb is given by
∆ =


1 , if Ce ≤ Rb −Rs
(Rb − Ce)/Rs , if Rb −Rs < Ce < Rb
0 , if Rb ≤ Ce.
(17)
Proof: The proof follows closely from [9, Corollary 2]
and the steps in [7, Section III] with H(Xn)
n
= Rb.
2Fixed-rate transmissions are often adopted to reduce system complexity.
In practice, applications like video streaming in multimedia applications often
require fixed-rate transmission.
6Note that ∆ in (17) actually gives an upper bound on
the achievable fractional equivocation for the wiretap code,
which is achieved by an ideal coding scheme with infinite
codeword length. It is worth mentioning that it is also of
significant importance to obtain the lower bound of the frac-
tional equivocation when investigating the performance of a
specific code, e.g., [22, 30] which study finite-length LDPC
codes. The secrecy performance guaranteed by a given code
can be characterized by the lower bound on the fractional
equivocation.
From (13), we can further derive (17) as
∆ =


1 , if γe ≤ 2Rb−Rs − 1
Rb−log2(1+γe)
Rs
, if 2Rb−Rs − 1 < γe < 2Rb−1
0 , if 2Rb − 1 ≤ γe.
(18)
Now, we are ready to evaluate the secrecy performance of
wireless transmissions over fading channels from the distribu-
tion of ∆, which can be derived according to the distribution
of γe given in (15).
1) Generalized Secrecy Outage Probability:
The generalized secrecy outage probability is given by
pout = P(∆ < θ)
= P
(
2Rb − 1 ≤ γe
)
+ P
(
2Rb−Rs − 1 < γe < 2
Rb − 1
)
· P
(
Rb−log2(1+γe)
Rs
<θ
∣∣∣∣2Rb−Rs−1< γe< 2Rb−1
)
= exp
(
−
2Rb−θRs − 1
γ¯e
)
, (19)
where 0 < θ ≤ 1.
For the extreme case of θ = 1, we have
pout(θ = 1) = exp
(
−
2Rb−Rs − 1
γ¯e
)
. (20)
We note that (20) is exactly the same as [12, Eq. (8)],
which gives the classical secrecy outage probability of wireless
transmissions with fixed-rate wiretap codes.
2) Average Fractional Equivocation – Asymptotic Lower
Bound on Eavesdropper’s Decoding Error Probability:
The average fractional equivocation is given by
∆¯=E{∆}
=
∫ 2Rb−Rs−1
0
fγe(γe)dγe+
∫ 2Rb−1
2Rb−Rs−1
(
Rb−log2(1+γe)
Rs
)
fγe(γe)dγe
=1−
1
Rsln 2
exp
(
1
γ¯e
)(
Ei
(
−
2Rb
γ¯e
)
−Ei
(
−
2Rb−Rs
γ¯e
))
, (21)
where Ei (x) =
∫ x
−∞
et/t dt denotes the exponential inte-
gral function. As mentioned before, the average fractional
equivocation actually gives an asymptotic lower bound on the
eavesdropper’s decoding error probability.
3) Average Information Leakage Rate:
Since a fixed-rate transmission scheme is adopted, the average
information leakage rate can be derived from (11), given by
RL = (1− ∆¯)Rs
=
1
ln 2
exp
(
1
γ¯e
)(
Ei
(
−
2Rb
γ¯e
)
−Ei
(
−
2Rb−Rs
γ¯e
))
, (22)
which captures how fast on average information is leaked to
Eve. Note that the derivation of RL in (22) does not depend
on the probability of transmission ptx, which indicates that
RL actually characterizes how fast on average the information
is leaked to the eavesdropper when a message transmission
occurs.
C. Numerical Results
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Confidential information rate, Rs
G
en
er
a
li
ze
d
se
cr
ec
y
o
u
ta
g
e
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y,
p
o
u
t
θ = 1
θ = 0.8
θ = 0.6
Fig. 2: Generalized secrecy outage probability versus confidential
information rate. Results are shown for networks with different
requirements on the fractional equivocation, θ = 1, 0.8, 0.6. The
other parameters are Rb = 1 and γ¯e = 1.
We first compare the generalized secrecy outage proba-
bilities subject to different requirements on the fractional
equivocation. Figure 2 plots pout versus Rs with different
values of θ. Note that the case of θ = 1 represents classical
secrecy outage probability. As shown in the figure, for different
levels of secrecy requirements measured in terms of the
fractional equivocation or the decodability of messages at Eve,
the transmission has different secrecy outage performance.
We find that the difference in the generalized secrecy outage
probabilities increases as the confidential information rate
increases.
We then present the secrecy performance measured by the
average fractional equivocation, which gives an asymptotic
lower bound on Eve’s decoding error probability. Figure 3
plots ∆¯ versus Rs. As shown in the figure, the average
fractional equivocation decreases as the confidential informa-
tion rate increases and/or the average received SNR at Eve
increases. We note that the average fractional equivocation
at Eve is not extremely high even when the confidential
information rate is very small. We also note that the average
fractional equivocation is non-zero even when the confiden-
tial information rate approaches the total transmission rate
(Rb = Rs). These observations indicate that the quality of the
wireless channel itself plays an important role in determining
the secrecy performance of the wireless system.
Next, we illustrate the secrecy performance measured by
the average information leakage rate. Figure 4 plots RL versus
Rs. As the figure shows, the average information leakage rate
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Fig. 3: Average fractional equivocation (asymptotic lower bound on
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rate. Results are shown for networks with different average received
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Fig. 4: Average information leakage rate versus confidential infor-
mation rate. Results are shown for networks with different average
received SNRs at Eve, γ¯e = 1, 2. The other parameter is Rb = 1.
increases as the confidential information rate increases and/or
the average received SNR at Eve increases. We note that RL
does not reach Rs even when Rs goes to Rb = 1. This implies
that the information is not all leaked to the eavesdropper even
when we use an ordinary code instead of the wiretap code for
transmission. This observation once again confirms that the
wireless channel itself can provide a certain level of secrecy
for the transmission.
Finally, we show that the secrecy performance of wireless
systems sometimes cannot be appropriately characterized by
the classical secrecy outage probability, while on the other
hand can be quantified by the newly purposed secrecy metrics.
In Figure 5, we evaluate the secrecy performance using classi-
cal secrecy outage probability and the newly proposed secrecy
metrics for systems with different channel quality for Eve. We
consider an extreme case where the confidential information
rate is the same as the total codeword rate, Rb = Rs.
This is equivalent to using an ordinary code instead of the
wiretap code for transmission. As shown in Figure 5(a), the
secrecy performance measured by the classical secrecy outage
probability (θ = 1) is not related to Eve’s channel condition,
since it is always equal to 1. However, we know that the de-
codability of messages at the receiver is related to the channel
condition. Intuitively, with an improvement in Eve’s channel
quality, the probability of error at Eve should decrease, and the
secrecy performance should become worse. Therefore, we see
that the secrecy performance cannot be properly characterized
by the classical secrecy outage probability. In contrast, we
find that the change of the secrecy performance with Eve’s
channel quality can be appropriately quantified by all three
of the newly proposed secrecy metrics. In Figure 5(a), the
generalized secrecy outage probability (θ = 0.8) increases as
the average SNR at Eve increases. In Figure 5(b), the average
fractional equivocation decreases as the average SNR at Eve
increases. In Figure 5(c), the average information leakage rate
increases as the average SNR at Eve increases. This simple
example of transmission with an ordinary code shows that the
newly proposed secrecy metrics are able to reveal information
about the secrecy performance that cannot be captured by the
classical secrecy outage probability.
V. IMPACT ON SYSTEM DESIGNS
In this section, we examine the significance of the newly
proposed secrecy metrics from the perspective of a system
designer, by answering the following questions:
Q1) Do the newly proposed secrecy metrics lead to different
system designs that optimize the secrecy performance,
compared with the optimal design parameters minimizing
the classical secrecy outage probability?
Q2) Does applying the optimal transmission design based
on the classical secrecy outage probability result in a
large secrecy loss, if the actual system requires a low
decodability at the eavesdropper or a low information
leakage rate?
As illustrated by the numerical results later in Section V-D,
the answers to both Q1 and Q2 are yes, which shows that the
newly proposed secrecy metrics have impact on the system
design, and the impact is significant. The fact that the answer
to Q1 is yes implies that system designers cannot adopt
the optimal design based on the classical secrecy outage
probability to optimize the secrecy performance measured by
the newly proposed secrecy metrics. The fact that the answer
to Q2 is yes indicates that adopting the optimal design based
on the classical secrecy outage probability would lead to a
large secrecy loss when the secrecy performance is measured
by the newly proposed secrecy metrics.
A. Problem Formulation
We still consider the system with fixed-rate wiretap codes
described in the previous section. We optimize the secrecy
performance of the wireless system subject to a throughput
constraint η > Γ, where η denotes the throughput of confiden-
tial message transmission and Γ denotes its minimum required
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Fig. 5: Secrecy performance versus Eve’s channel quality. Results are shown for the transmission with Rb = Rs = 1. (a) Generalized secrecy
outage probability versus average received SNR at Eve. (b) Average fractional equivocation versus average received SNR at Eve. (c) Average
information leakage rate versus average received SNR at Eve.
value. The controllable parameters to design are the wiretap
code rates Rb and Rs. Taking into account the probability of
transmission given in (16), the throughput of the confidential
message transmission is given by
η = ptxRs = exp
(
−
2Rb − 1
γ¯b
)
Rs. (23)
We specifically formulate three problems for the systems
with different secrecy metrics as follows:
Problem 1: Minimize the generalized secrecy outage proba-
bility
min
Rb,Rs
pout = exp
(
−
2Rb−θRs − 1
γ¯e
)
, (24)
s.t. η ≥ Γ, Rb ≥ Rs > 0. (25)
Problem 2: Maximize the average fractional equivocation
max
Rb,Rs
∆¯=1−
1
Rsln 2
exp
(
1
γ¯e
)(
Ei
(
−
2Rb
γ¯e
)
−Ei
(
−
2Rb−Rs
γ¯e
))
,(26)
s.t. η ≥ Γ, Rb ≥ Rs > 0. (27)
Problem 3: Minimize the average information leakage rate
min
Rb,Rs
RL=
1
ln 2
exp
(
1
γ¯e
)(
Ei
(
−
2Rb
γ¯e
)
−Ei
(
−
2Rb−Rs
γ¯e
))
, (28)
s.t. η ≥ Γ, Rb ≥ Rs > 0. (29)
B. Feasibility of the Constraint
The required throughput constraint is not feasible when Γ
is larger than the maximum achievable throughput for Rb ≥
Rs > 0. We find that the three problems have the same feasible
constraint region, which is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 2: The feasible range of the throughput con-
straint is given by
0 ≤ Γ ≤
W0(γ¯b)
ln 2
exp
(
−
2
W0(γ¯b)
ln 2 − 1
γ¯b
)
, (30)
where W0(·) denotes the principal branch of the Lambert W
function.
Proof: See Appendix A.
C. Optimal Rate Parameters
We denote Rs,min and Rs,max as the solutions of x to
exp
(
− 2
x
−1
γ¯b
)
x = Γ with Rs,min < Rs,max. The optimal so-
lutions to Problems 1, 2 and 3 are summarized in Propositions
3, 4 and 5, respectively, as follows.
Proposition 3: The optimal rate parameters minimizing the
generalized secrecy outage probability are given as follows:
R∗b1 = log2
(
1− γ¯b ln
Γ
R∗s1
)
(31)
and
R∗s1 =


Rs,min , if Rs,min > Rso
Rso , if Rs,min ≤ Rso ≤ Rs,max
Rs,max , if Rs,max < Rso,
(32)
where Rso is the solution of x to
θ =
γ¯b
x ln(2)
(
1− γ¯b ln
(
Γ
x
)) . (33)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Proposition 4: The optimal rate parameters maximizing the
average fractional equivocation are given as follows:
R∗b2 = log2
(
1− γ¯b ln
Γ
R∗s2
)
(34)
and R∗s2 is obtained by numerically solving the following
problem:
min
x
1
x
(
Ei
(
−
1−γ¯b ln
Γ
x
γ¯e
)
−Ei
(
−
1− γ¯b ln
Γ
x
γ¯e2x
))
, (35)
s.t. Rs,min ≤ x ≤ Rs,max. (36)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Proposition 5: The optimal rate parameters minimizing the
average information leakage rate are given as follows:
R∗b3 = log2
(
1− γ¯b ln
Γ
R∗s3
)
(37)
9and R∗s3 is obtained by numerically solving the following
problem:
min
x
Ei
(
−
1− γ¯b ln
Γ
x
γ¯e
)
− Ei
(
−
1− γ¯b ln
Γ
x
γ¯e2x
)
, (38)
s.t. Rs,min ≤ x ≤ Rs,max. (39)
Proof: The proof follows closely from the proof of
Proposition 4 in Appendix C.
Remark 2: The numerical optimization problems for ob-
taining R∗s2 and R∗s3 in Propositions 4 and 5 can be easily
solved by either a simple brute-force search or techniques like
the golden section search [33].
D. Numerical Results
In this subsection, we present numerical results for a wire-
less system with γ¯b = 10 dB and γ¯e = 10 dB to demonstrate
the impact of the new secrecy metrics on system designs. The
feasible range of the throughput constraint is 0 ≤ Γ ≤ 1.569,
which is obtained by Proposition 2. Specifically, we can find
the answer to Q1 by examining Figures 6 and 7 and we can
find the answer to Q2 by examining Figures 8, 9 and 10.
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Fig. 6: For different secrecy metrics: optimal confidential information
rate versus minimum required throughput. The other parameters are
θ = 1, γ¯b = 10 dB and γ¯e = 10 dB.
We first compare the transmission rates that optimize the
secrecy performance of the system measured by different
secrecy metrics. Figure 6 plots the optimal confidential in-
formation rate R∗s versus the throughput constraint Γ. The
values of R∗s1, R∗s2 and R∗s3 are obtained by Propositions 3, 4
and 5, respectively. The optimal codeword transmission rate
R∗b is not shown in the figure, since the optimal codeword
transmission rate is equal to R∗b = log2
(
1− γ¯b ln
Γ
R∗s
)
for
all three problems, and the differences between R∗b1, R∗b2
and R∗b3 are determined by the differences between R∗s1, R∗s2
and R∗s3. As depicted in the figure, the values of R∗s1, R∗s2
and R∗s3 are clearly different from each other. We note that
R∗s1 = R
∗
s2 = R
∗
s3 if and only if the throughput constraint is
very stringent, in which case the transmission rates are totally
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Fig. 7: For generalized secrecy outage probability: optimal confiden-
tial information rate versus minimum required throughput. Results
are shown for networks with different requirements on the fractional
equivocation, θ = 1, 0.8, 0.6. The other parameters are γ¯b = 10 dB
and γ¯e = 10 dB.
determined by the throughput constraint. The observations
above illustrate that the optimal transmission designs are very
different when we use different secrecy metrics to evaluate
secrecy performance.
Next, we focus on the optimal transmission rates that min-
imize the generalized secrecy outage probabilities subject to
different requirements on the fractional equivocation. Figure 7
plots R∗s1 versus Γ for different values of θ. As shown in the
figure, the optimal transmission rates minimizing the secrecy
outage probability are different if the required values of θ are
different. We find that the optimal confidential information rate
R∗s1 increases as the level of required fractional equivocation θ
decreases. The observations from Figures 6 and 7 confirm that
the answer to Q1 is yes: the newly proposed secrecy metrics
lead to very different system design choices that optimize the
secrecy performance.
In the following, we answer the second question listed at
the beginning of this section using Figures 8, 9 and 10. From
the analytical results, we have obtained three different solu-
tions of the optimal design parameters: (R∗b1, R∗s1) is optimal
for minimizing the generalized secrecy outage probability;
(R∗b2, R
∗
s2) is optimal for maximizing the average fractional
equivocation; (R∗b3, R∗s3) is optimal for minimizing the average
information leakage rate. We collectively consider all three
design solutions and study their performance for all three
secrecy metrics. Specifically, Figure 8 plots pout, Figure 9 plots
∆¯, and Figure 10 plots RL achieved by the different design
strategies. As shown in the figures, transmission with R∗b1 and
R∗s1 minimizes the secrecy outage probability, but leads to a
considerable loss if the practical secrecy requirement is to en-
sure a high fractional equivocation (decoding error probability
at Eve) or a low information leakage rate. Similarly, trans-
mission with R∗b2 and R∗s2 maximizes the average fractional
equivocation, but incurs a considerable loss if the practical
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Fig. 8: Secrecy outage probability versus minimum required through-
put. The other parameters are θ = 1, γ¯b = 10 dB and γ¯e = 10 dB.
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Fig. 9: Average fractional equivocation (asymptotic lower bound on
the decoding error probability at Eve) versus minimum required
throughput. The other parameters are θ = 1, γ¯b = 10 dB and γ¯e = 10
dB.
secrecy requirement is to have a low secrecy outage probability
or a low information leakage rate. Finally, transmission with
R∗b3 and R∗s3 minimizes the average information leakage rate,
but incurs a large loss if the practical secrecy requirement
is to maintain a low secrecy outage probability or a high
fractional equivocation. The observations from Figures 8, 9
and 10 show that it is important to design the system with
the appropriate secrecy metric. It is also confirmed that the
answer to Q2 is yes: applying the transmission design based
on the classical secrecy outage probability can result in a large
secrecy loss if the actual system requires a low decodability
at the eavesdropper or a low information leakage rate.
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Fig. 10: Average information leakage rate versus minimum required
throughput. The other parameters are θ = 1, γ¯b = 10 dB and γ¯e = 10
dB.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
To address the practical limitations of using classical secrecy
outage probability as a metric for secrecy, we proposed three
new metrics for physical layer security over quasi-static fading
channels. Specifically, the generalized secrecy outage proba-
bility establishes a link between the concept of secrecy outage
and the decodability of messages at the eavesdropper. The
asymptotic lower bound on the eavesdropper’s decoding error
probability provides a direct error-probability-based secrecy
metric. The average information leakage rate characterizes
how fast the confidential information is leaked to the eaves-
dropper when classical information-theoretic secrecy is not
achieved. We evaluated the performance of an example wire-
less system with fixed-rate wiretap codes using the proposed
secrecy metrics. We showed that the new secrecy metrics
provide a more comprehensive understanding of physical
layer security over fading channels. We also found that the
new secrecy metrics can give insights on the secrecy per-
formance of wireless transmissions that sometimes cannot be
captured by classical secrecy outage probability. Furthermore,
we examined the significance of the newly proposed secrecy
metrics from the perspective of a system designer. We found
that applying the optimal transmission design minimizing
the classical secrecy outage probability can result in a large
secrecy loss, if the actual system requires a low decodability
at the eavesdropper or a low information leakage rate. The
new secrecy metrics enable appropriate transmission designs
for systems with different secrecy requirements. We hope
that this work can help bridge the gap between theory and
practice in physical layer security by inspiring more future
studies adopting and building on the newly proposed secrecy
metrics. Besides, as mentioned previously in Section I-A, it
is of importance to investigate secrecy metrics for wireless
systems with finite-length coding schemes, since the classical
information-theoretic secrecy cannot be achieved by finite-
length codes. While the secrecy metrics proposed in this
11
work did not focus on the finite-length coding schemes, it is
also a very interesting future research direction to investigate
appropriate secrecy metrics specifically for wireless systems
with finite-length codes.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
To determine the maximum achievable secrecy throughput,
we first obtain the optimal rate parameters that maximize the
secrecy throughput. The problem is formulated as
max
Rb,Rs
η = exp
(
−
2Rb − 1
γ¯b
)
Rs, (40)
s.t. Rb ≥ Rs > 0. (41)
Given any Rs, we find that ∂η/∂Rb is always less than 0.
Hence given any Rs, it is wise to have the minimum Rb, i.e.,
Rb = Rs, for maximizing η. Then, the problem changes to
max
Rs
η (Rb = Rs) = exp
(
−
2Rs − 1
γ¯b
)
Rs, (42)
s.t. Rs > 0. (43)
Taking the first order derivative of η (Rb = Rs) with respect
to Rs, we have
∂η (Rb=Rs)
∂Rs
=exp
(
−
2Rs − 1
γ¯b
)(
1−
2RsRs ln 2
γ¯b
)
. (44)
By solving for Rs in ∂η(Rb=Rs)∂Rs = 0, we obtain the optimal
value of Rs that maximizes η, which is given by
R⋄s =
W0(γ¯b)
ln 2
. (45)
Finally, substituting Rs = R⋄s into (42) completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
As analyzed in Appendix A, given any Rs, it is wise to have
the minimum Rb, i.e., Rb = Rs, for maximizing η. Hence, we
can obtain the feasible range of Rs for satisfying the through-
put constraint by solving Rs in the equation η (Rb = Rs) = Γ.
The feasible range is given by Rs,min ≤ Rs ≤ Rs,max.
From pout = exp
(
− 2
Rb−θRs−1
γ¯e
)
, we find that minimizing
pout is equivalent to maximizing
O1 = Rb − θRs. (46)
To minimize O1 in (46), it is wise to have the maximum Rb
while satisfying the throughput constraint, for any given Rs.
From η = exp
(
− 2
Rb−1
γ¯b
)
Rs ≥ Γ, we have
Rb ≤ log2
(
1− γ¯b ln
Γ
Rs
)
. (47)
Hence, we obtain R∗b1 as in (31). Then, we can rewrite the
optimization problem as
max
Rs
log2
(
1− γ¯b ln
Γ
Rs
)
− θRs, (48)
s.t. Rs,min ≤ Rs ≤ Rs,max. (49)
Finally, by solving for Rs in the equation ∂O1∂Rs = 0 and
considering the feasible range of Rs, we obtain R∗s1 as in (32).
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
The feasible range of Rs for satisfying the throughput
constraint is given by Rs,min ≤ Rs ≤ Rs,max. From ∆¯ =
1− 1
Rs ln 2
exp
(
1
γ¯e
)(
Ei
(
− 2
Rb
γ¯e
)
− Ei
(
− 2
Rb−Rs
γ¯e
))
, we find
that maximizing ∆¯ is equivalent to minimizing
O2 =
1
Rs
(
Ei
(
−
2Rb
γ¯e
)
− Ei
(
−
2Rb−Rs
γ¯e
))
. (50)
Given any Rs, we have
∂O2
∂Rb
=
ln(2)
Rs
(
exp
(
−
2Rb
γ¯e
)
− exp
(
−
2Rb−Rs
γ¯e
))
< 0.
(51)
Hence given any Rs, it is wise to have the maximum Rb
while satisfying the throughput constraint to minimize O2
in (50). Hence, we obtain R∗b2 as in (34). Then, we rewrite
the optimization problem as (35). We find that the closed-form
solution of R∗s2 is mathematically intractable. We can obtain
R∗s2 by numerically solving the problem. This completes the
proof.
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